COMMENTS
ENFORCEMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Enforcement of equal opportunity in employment would be difficult
under any statute. Even if implementation were entrusted to a powerful
quasi-judicial agency, the inherent difficulties in policing an area "where
subtleties of conduct may play no small part" are so formidable as to
obstruct proof of much illegal discrimination. The effort to protect the
employer's interest in making non-discriminatory business decisions
without governmental interference led Congress to compound the inevitable complexities of enforcement in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2
No section of the Civil Rights bill was more extensively revised in the
course of its passage than was the fair employment title; a barrage of
delimiting amendments, which emasculated the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [EEOC] and compelled deferral to state and
local agencies, disappointed proponents of the legislation and has led,
commentators to belittle the possibilities of enforcing title VII.3
This comment will examine the problems which must be confronted
when the enforcement provisions of title VI14 take effect on July 2,
1 NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 812 U.S. 426, 437 (1941), quoted in the landmark
fair employment case of Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954).
2 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). Hereafter the act will be referred to by section
number alone.
3 See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 96-97 (1964); Kammholz, Civil Rights Problems in Personnel
and Labor Relations, 53 ILL. B.J. 465, 479 (1965). ("Businessmen subject to title VII
should disregard it.') For statements evincing the disappointment of liberal supporters
of strong FEP legislation, see 110 CONG. REc. 12580 (1964) (Humphrey statement of
regret that "we have weakened the bill'); 110 CONG. REc. 12593 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Clark); 110 CONG. REEc. 14189 (1964) (description by Senator Douglas of Federal
Commission as "a blind alley and a delaying chamber'); CONG. Q. WEE-KLY REPORT, May
15, 1964, p. 949 (Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, an influential lobby representing eighty-five national civil rights, church, labor and civic groups, tentatively rejects
leadership compromise).
4 Sections 703 and 704 make it an unlawful employment practice for certain employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to discriminate against individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The basic coverage
of title VII remained largely unchanged throughout congressional debate and will not
be considered in any detail in this comment. See generally BuR'EAu OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, THE Cvr.. RIGHTs ACr OF 1964, at 23-31 ("Operations Manual" for laymen);
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1965. 5 First to be considered is a major set of problems which will arise
from the limitations placed upon the authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and its jurisdictional overlap with other
state and federal agencies. A second section of the comment will deal
with the considerable discretionary power which title VII has lodged in
the federal executive. Finally, the comment will consider problems that
will face the federal judiciary when it attempts to fashion standards for
proof of discrimination and appropriate remedial action. As background
for these issues the legislative' history should first be briefly considered,
for an understanding of title VII is not easily obtained without knowledge of its original structure and of the far-reaching Senate compromise.
Before the March on Washington in 1963, bills attempting to establish
federal regulation of employment practices had been voted down amid
great controversy in every session of Congress since World War 11.6 When
in the aftermath of the Birmingham riots the Kennedy administration
began to frame a comprehensive civil rights proposal, its spokesmen
feared that inclusion of strong fair employment provisions would endanger the entire bill.7 Nevertheless in October 1963 the House Judiciary
Committee decided to incorporate into a separate title of the omnibus
proposals a pre-existing Fair Employment Practices bill 9 which was
mired before the Rules Committee. As a result, delimiting amendments
to title VII were accepted throughout the legislative process so that other
titles of the bill could survive relatively unscathed. Particularly drastic
revisions were imposed during a final "leadership compromise" in the
Senate; Senator Humphrey, the floor manager, explained that "we have
taken title VII and rewritten it." 10 Less than a week after this "dean
Berg, supra note 3, at 68-78; Note, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684, 688-90 (1965). The inclusion
of sex may provoke special problems in enforcement which are also beyond the scope
of this comment. See Berg, supra at 75-76, 78-81.
5 Sections 716(a)-(b). There will be further delay of three years until coverage is fully
extended. Cf. §§ 701(b),(e).
5 See Ruc:HA.!s, RACE, JOBS AND POLriICS 22-72 (1953), for early efforts to pass a
federal FEP Law.
7 See Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on the Civil Rights Bill of

1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 2661 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). The
original administration proposal, introduced in the House on June 20, 1964, contained
a weak employment title which would merely have given statutory authority to the
already established President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. H.R.
7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
8 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
9 H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
10 110 CONG. Rxc. 12580 (1964).
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bill" was presented, however, cloture was invoked; passage of the bill
thereafter was only a matter of time."
It is therefore the clean bill shaped during the leadership conference
that stands virtually intact as law today. Instead of drafting a new bill,
the participants in the compromise considered separately over seventy
amendments proposed by Senator Dirksen, the one man who could
command the Republican votes necessary for cloture.' 2 Upon him fell
the task of persuading dubious Senators that the proposal included adequate safeguards for businessmen and for independent state action. 13
Such extensive revision necessarily changed the original understanding
of the enforcement procedures, but a cogent explanation of the
policies underlying the compromise was never offered. 14 It is evident
nonetheless that Dirksen's amendments altered title VII in two fundamental ways: (1) by separating public prevention from private remedies,
and placing more emphasis upon the latter; and (2) by expanding the
role of the states, while making federal action generally a spur to and
reinforcement of effective activity on a local level. 15
As originally conceived, title VII would primarily have established
a "public right" and only incidentally created a private one. 16 Like the
NLRA, title VII was to have been enforced by a federal agency empowered to eliminate discriminatory practices by issuing cease-and-desist
orders.' 7 Although the new Federal Commission, like the NLRB, would
have been able to grant such relief as back pay and reinstatement, 8
11 The Senate version was examined for one .day by the House Rules Committee and
passed by the House on July 2, 1964, after an hour of debate.
12 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RFPORT, May 15, 1964, p. 947 and June 19, 1964, p. 1199.
Is See Kempton, Dirksen Delivers the Souls, The New Republic, May 2, 1964, p. 9.
14 Dirksen's one major speech was devoted entirely to why the Senate had a moral
duty to pass civil rights legislation. 110 CONG. REc. 13087 (1964). Because the compromise was reached in secret sessions off the Senate floor there are no committee
reports to indicate how the wording was hammered out. Congressional comment is
limited because cloture was invoked less than a week after the clean bill was presented.
Although several pedestrian memoranda explaining the differences between the
House and Senate bills were offered, most of the debate consisted of misrepresentation
of the bill by its Southern opponents and futile attempts by its supporters to correct
these stubborn misconceptions.
15 See 110 CONG. REC. 12807-17 (1964) for text of the House bill set out with Senate
amendments and deletions noted.
16 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), where the purpose of
title VII is defined as "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal
remedial procedures, discrimination in employment."
17 H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 90) (1963); cf. H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
18 See 110 CONG. REc. 6550 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). For interpretations of the NLRB authority, see, e.g., NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-08
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private individuals would presumably have had no more control over
the settlement of their complaints than do charging parties under the
NLRA. The leadership compromise completed the attenuation of the
Commission 19 by divesting it of all enforcement power and denying it
access to the courts;2 0 but in return every grievant was granted the opportunity to seek redress in the federal courts. 2 1 Lest the public interest

suffer from this reorientation, the Attorney General was entrusted with
prevention of discriminatory practices by granting the Justice Department full-fledged authority to eliminate "patterns or practices" of
22
discrimination.
The second major change was to shift preliminary enforcement responsibility from federal to state and local authorities. Although the bill
always allowed the Federal Commission to cede its jurisdiction to state
and local agencies, 23 the leadership compromise also protected state and
local procedures by requiring the Commission to delay for at least sixty
days if a state or local agency were attempting to settle the dispute.24
The change presumably reflects a judgment that local persons with a
special understanding of the area and of the preventive methods appropriate for it can better cope with discrimination than the federal
government.25 But by leaving cession to the Commission's discretion and
allowing the Commission to enter a case if the state or local agency has
not adequately remedied the alleged violation, the act plays a sophisticated variation on the familiar carrot-and-stick theme, providing not
(1959); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940); see generally Note, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 69, 76-78 (1963).
19 Even before the title had left the House it had been cut into so that the agency
could no longer issue orders; instead it was granted immediate access to the federal
courts, but specifically relieved from "any obligation to bring a civil action" if it
would not "serve the public interest." H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(b) (1963).
The public-private relation had even then begun to break down, for a plaintiff could
proceed to court himself when the Commission refused to do so if he could get the
permission of just one of the five Commissioners, § 707(c). Even so, it has been
said that this section was designed to prevent an arbitrary refusal to sue by the
Commission and so was not considered inconsistent with the "public right" rationale.
Berg, supra note 3, at 67.
20 Section 706(e). But see note 37 infra for an exception.
21 110 CONG. REc. 14191 (1964) (remarks of Senator Javits); Hearings Before the
House Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (remarks of
Representative Celler).
2 Section 707.
23 Section 708.
24 Sections 706(b)-(c). The state authority must, however, meet certain minimal
standards. See text at notes 60-69 infra.
25 See 110 CONG. Rxc. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 110 CoN,. Rc.
13087 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
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only an incentive for the state and local agencies to be effective but also
a threat of intervention if they are not.
The act's utilization of deferral and cession is an ingenious experiment
in federal-state relations, and separating private relief from public prevention may be more effective than combining the two possibly conflicting objectives in one agency. But tacking these innovations onto the
original fair employment bill has created unfortunate structural ambiguities. In addition, the title shows the strains of a compromise measure.
Much of the language is vague; predictable difficulties have not been
provided for. Such problems will make implementation of title VII exceedingly difficult.
1.

ENFORCEMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

A. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Under the original House bill the primary responsibility for enforcing
title VII would have been lodged in the Equal Employment Opportunity
26
Commission, which was to be endowed with quasi-judicial authority.
Before the bill reached the Senate the Commission had been limited
to a role as prosecutor; in the Senate it was stripped of its last
vestige of enforcement authority and was restricted to a role of confidential mediation.27 Title VII continues to reflect, however, the original
framework. Individuals who wish federal assistance must in most in28
stances first apply to the Commission.
Despite the limitation of its function, the structure of the Commission
somewhat anomalously remains unchanged from the original House bill.
Obviously modeled upon the independent regulatory agencies, the Commission will be composed of five members, no more than three of whom
29
can be chosen from the same political party.
Limitations upon the Commission's power to seek private remedies are
everywhere apparent. Whereas the House bill permitted charges to be
26 H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(j) (1963), submitted by the House Education
and Labor Committee, authorized the Commission to issue cease-and-desist orders.
The revised version, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), gave the Commission power
to subpoena witnesses, conduct public hearings, and sue in the courts itself.
27 The Commission's enforcement power might instructively be -measured against
recommendations for federal legislation made by two experts from the Research
Project on Minority Group Employment at the Industrial Relations Section of
Princeton University. The authors urged that a federal commission be empowered to
conduct public hearings and issue cease-and-desist orders enforceable in the courts.
See NORGREN

& HILL, ToWAan FAur EMPLOYMENT 254-58,

264-65

(1964)

[hereafter

cited as NORGREN & HiLL].
28 CI. § 706. For a possible exception to this requirement, see text at notes 155-59
infra.
29 Section 705(a). Commissioners will be chosen for staggered five year terms by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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filed "on behalf of" aggrieved individuals s 0 the Commission may now
accept only charges made in writing and under oath 3' by the person
claiming to be aggrieved.3 2 Although the Commission may examine
witnesses under oath, it must apply to a federal district court for an
order directing compliance if the person refuses to appear; even so, "the
attendance of a witness may not be required outside the state where he
is found, resides, or transacts business."33 Its request to examine and
copy evidence which is relevant to the charge is enforceable by a subsequent court order.3 4 Finally, if after preliminary investigation the Commission finds "reasonable cause to believe" that the charge against the
respondent is true, it must confine its remedial efforts to "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."35 All conciliation
proceedings must remain strictly confidential.3 6
Because the Commission can neither issue orders nor sue in the
courts, 3 7 only informal pressure will be available to reinforce its efforts at

voluntary compliance. The Commission is authorized, for example, to
recommend to the Attorney General that he intervene in a civil action
brought by a grievant for whom the Commission was unable to achieve
voluntary settlement 38 within sixty days.39 It may also advise and assist
the Justice Department in subsequent litigation. 40 Whether the Commission may properly assist an individual plaintiff in this manner if the
Attorney General fails to intervene is questionable: presumably had such
aid been contemplated it would have been outlined in the act just as is
the Commission's license to assist the Justice Department. On the other
30 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(a) (1964).
31 The formal requirement that a charge be written and sworn, coupled with the
possibility that a perjury charge will be brought against the complainant if the Commission dismisses his charge, may discourage complaints to the Commission.
32 Section 706(a). See Hearings Before the House Committee on Rules on H. Res.
789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-27 (1964) (memorandum submitted by Representative
McCulloch).
33 Sections 710(a)-(b). The Commission may compensate witnesses at the same rates
which federal courts pay. Section 705(g)(2).
34 Sections 709(a), 710(b).
35 Section 706(a).
36 Section 706(a). Criminal sanctions including up to a year in prison and a $1,000
fine may be imposed upon any officer or employee of the Commission who violates this
section.
37 An exception is that the Commission may commence court proceedings under
§ 706(i) if a defendant refuses to comply with a court order issued in a suit by a
complainant who had originally come to the Commission.
38 Section 705(g)(6).
39 Section 706(e) allows the Commission thirty days to achieve voluntary compliance
but permits extension to sixty days at the Commission's option. Within thirty days
thereafter the grievant can sue in a federal district court.
40 Section 705(g)(6).
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hand, since the restrictions on publicity apply solely to the original
charge and to the conciliation process, 41 the Commission may sometimes
choose to release the results of its investigation to an individual plaintiff.4 2 Such a possibility may induce some respondents to settle during
the conciliation process. But although some state FEPCs have found that
publicity lends credibility to their efforts, 43 the Commission's reliance
upon it will undoubtedly be extremely limited because it cannot hold
open hearings and because criminal sanctions can be imposed upon any
Commission employee who releases information that should properly
have been kept confidential.
State experience suggests that settlements of individual complaints by
the Commission itself are likely to be infrequent. A nearly identical state
agency in Kansas which also was restricted to investigation and confidential mediation was so ineffectual that after eight years the statute was
redrawn.4 4 Parallel experiences with non-enforceable acts in Indiana,
41 Section 706(a). The prohibition against publicizing anything "said or done
during. . , such endeavors" should be limited to results of the conciliation proceeding.
"Endeavor" takes on connotations of a word of art because it is used previously in
the section with specific and sole reference to conciliation and because "said or done"
indicates that Congress had mediation rather than investigation in mind.
42 Section 709(e) makes it "unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission
to make public in any matter whatever any information obtained by the Commission
pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding
under this title involving such information." If the phrase "prior to the institution" is
read as a modification of "make public" rather than "obtained," the Commission
should be able to release information after litigation has begun. Congressional intent
indicates the section should be given the less restrictive reading; Senator Humphrey
stated with respect to the confidentiality required by §§ 706(a) and 709(e): "[IT]his is
a ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of
the Commission's duties under the statute. Obviously, the proper conduct of an
investigation would ordinarily require that the witnesses be informed that a charge
had been filed and often that certain evidence had been received. Such disclosure would
be proper. The amendment is not intended to hamper Commission investigations or
proper cooperation with other State and Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the
making available to the general public of unproved charges." 110 CONG. Rrc. 12723
(1964). Regardless of how § 709(e) is interpreted, information gathered under § 710(a),
which duplicates certain of the § 709(a) investigatory authority and also permits the
Commission to examine witnesses under oath, can be made public, apparently at any
time, as the § 709(e) strictures are limited to that particular section.
43 The Washington FEPC has been highly successful by following a policy of
publicizing the entire settlement procedure. See generally, Note, The Right to Equal
Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HAv.
L. REv. 526, 547 (1961).
44 Between 1953 and 1960 the agency was unable to reach an adjustment with
twenty-one of twenty-two employers it approached until it called upon the President's
Committee on Government Contracts for assistance. 1960 KANSAS ANTI-DisCIUMINATION
COMMISSION REPORT OF PROGRESS 12; see also 1961 REPORT oF PRoG RSS 11. The law was

amended in 1961 to enable the Commission not only to hold hearings and issue ceaseand-desist orders but also to order an employer to hire or reinstate a complainant with
back pay. GE. STATS. KAN. §§ 44-1001-1004 (Supp. 1961).
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Baltimore and Cleveland confirm that voluntary programs are generally
ineffective.4 5 Most aggrieved individuals will probably attempt to avoid
the Commission or, at best, will regard it as a mandatory intermediate
stage in the enforcement process.
The Commission's power to initiate investigations may be more effective.4 6 State FEP agencies have found industry-wide surveys more successful than enforcement on a case-by-case basis.4 7 The EEOC could adopt a
similar approach by utilizing information amassed in the detailed records
it can require employers, unions, and employment agencies to keep.4 8
In addition, the statute places no limitations on the breadth of the
charges which the Commission can frame. These two factors alleviate
any disability imposed by a Dirksen amendment which sought to eliminate so-called "fishing expeditions" by restricting the Commission's
investigatory powers to evidence "relevant to the charge." 49 As in its
efforts to settle individual complaints, the Commission lacks formal
enforcement power, but several avenues are open to it if its investigations
disclose evidence of discrimination: (1) it can recommend to any aggrieved
person covered by its original charge that he bring a private suit, 50 and
(2) it can request the Attorney General to initiate an action against a
discriminatory "pattern or practice" under his section 707 authority.51
In either instance it should be able to divulge the results of its investigation to the plaintiff.52 The Commission can most effectively fulfill its
45 NoawREN & HILL 225-27. See also Leland, We Believe in Employment on Merit,
But ...,37 MINN. L. REv. 246, 265-66 (1953).
46 Section 706(a). An investigation will be undertaken whenever one member of the
Commission attests in a written charge that he has reasonable cause to believe a
violation of title VII has occurred.
47 See NORGREN & HILL 231-33, 251; Note, 74 HARv.L. REY. 526, 537 (1961).
48 Cf. § 709(c). The comprehensive nature of the records which the Commission
can demand is indicated by the extensive requirements specified for reports on
apprenticeship programs.
49 Sections 709(a), 710(a). The Senate amendment altered the House bill's broader
language, which required only that the evidence sought "relate to any matter under
investigation or in question." H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 709(a) (1964).
50 How an individual could otherwise be informed that he was named in a charge
is unclear in light of § 706(a)'s express stipulation that no charges are to be made
public on pain of criminal sanction. This conflict is further evidence that, to give
meaning to the statute, "make public" must be read as "publicize," as in mass media,
rather than merely to release information.
51 Section 705(g)(6).
52 It might be argued that § 705(g)(6), empowering the Commission to "advise,
consult and assist the Attorney General," conflicts with the confidentiality of information gathered in investigations apparently demanded prior to litigation by § 709(e). A
restrictive reading might hamper enforcement: if the Attorney General is not permitted
access to evidence collected by the Commission, he may be reluctant to act on its
recommendation to sue. The conflict might be resolved, however, by construing "make
public" so as not to refer to intra-government communications. Cf. the argument of
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statutory responsibility to eliminate discrimination if in addition to its
mediatory function it serves as the investigatory arm of a public prosecutor, requesting the Attorney General to sue whenever it collects evi53
dence of an illegal practice which it is unable to eradicate.
B. Problems of Overlapping Jurisdiction Between Agencies
Businessmen, as the Chamber of Commerce has complained, may soon
be forced to deal with a battery of governmental agencies investigating
racial discrimination in employment. 54 Certainly concurrent jurisdiction
of some complexity has been created by the Civil Rights Act. Indeed
title VII encourages the proliferation of state and local FEP agencies,
which are to share their jurisdiction with the EEOC and the Attorney
General. The NLRB, the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity, and the Community Relations Service also patrol the
field. Some commentators fear administrative chaos. 55
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction:The EEOC and State and Local Agencies.
The concurrent jurisdiction provided by the act will grow as more states
and localities pass FEP laws. 56 If the jurisdiction in which the alleged
violation occurred has a law under which charges may be brought and
relief granted, the complaint must first be directed to the appropriate
state or local authority. 57 The act then requires a delay of at least sixty
days before the Commission can investigate the case. 58 Although the
Commission is empowered to eliminate such concurrency by signing
away its jurisdiction, 59 the standards it should utilize in determining
deferral and cession are unclear.
The delay provided by the act is contingent upon certain minimal
conditions. The state or local law must not only prohibit the practice
alleged but also establish an authority to "grant or seek relief." 60 Although courts will probably not qualify,61 most other authorities will;
the Department of Justice and the FBI that "divulgence" of information found by
wire-tapping in violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act has not
occurred when one member of the government communicates it to another. See, e.g.,
Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197-99 (1934);
Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping,63 YALE L.J. 792, 793 (1954).
53 For a statement of the hand-in-glove approach anticipated by Senator Humphrey,
see 110 CONG. REc. 12724 (1964).
54 57 LAB. Ra.. REP. 157 (1964).
55 See Drew, The Civil Rights Maze, The Reporter, Dec. 17, 1964, p. 12.
56 Sections 1104 and 708 protect state and local laws from pre-emption.
57 Sections 706(b)-(c).
58 Ibid.
59 Section 709(b).
60 Sections 706(b)-(c).
61 The state enforcement authorities which merit deferral apparently do not include
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the statute's use of "seek" seems to admit for deferral even those state
agencies which can only mediate on a voluntary basis. 62 In a curious
deviation from its remedial rationale, title VII also provides that a state
or local authority which can institute criminal proceedings will activate
mandatory deferral. 6 Apparently old, largely unenforced statutes that
make discrimination in employment a misdemeanor 6 4 and new statutes
that fail to afford substantive relief but meet the formal requirements
of the act 65 will qualify; perhaps only when giving effect to a state statute
would frustrate the purpose of the federal statute66 will an exception to
the deferral requirement be made. Thus, in most jurisdictions grievants
will probably not be able to bring an action or obtain federal assistance
until sixty days after complaining to the appropriate state or local
67
agency.
After sixty days the Commission is authorized to begin independent
investigation, 68 regardless of whether its state or local counterpart continues to handle the case. The language of sections 706(a) and (b) 69 and
state courts, which seem to be outside statutory purview here because of the requirement that a "charge" be "filed" with the state or local authority. The existence in
twenty-five states of FEP enforcement authorities also seems to indicate that such
administrative bodies were what Congress had in mind.
62 But see United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1954),
where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the administrative remedy
offered by the Federal Trade Commission should first be exhausted by finding that
"the only function of the Federal Trade Conmission . . . is to investigate, recommend
and report. It can give no remedy. It can make no controlling finding of law or fact.
Its recommendations need not be followed by any court or administrative or executive
officer." Id. at 210.
63 Sections 706(b)-(c).
64 E.g., Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Vermont. Other states which make racial discrimination in employment a criminal offense also have authorities to "grant or seek" relief
for the victim. For a survey of how infrequently criminal actions are brought under
the misdemeanor laws, see KoNvrrz, THE CONSTrrUTION AND Civm RiGrrs 192 (1947).
65 Senator Clark, a floor manager of title VII, expressed fear that unenforced city
ordinances enacted by Southern municipalities solely out of obstructionist zeal would
invoke the period of mandatory deferral. 110 CONG. REc. 12595 (1964).
66 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714, 722 (1963) (dictum).
67 At the date of this writing twenty-one states have enforceable FEP statutes which
should definitely qualify for deferral, and passage of more can be expected imminently.
Delaware, Nevada, Oklahoma, and West Virginia have statutes without enforcement
provisions which may also qualify if "seek" is construed to include voluntary
conciliation. See BuEEATu OF NATIONAL ArFAms, THE Civit RIGHTs Acr OF 1964, at 57
(1964). See generally, BuRuEAu OF NATIONAL ArFAIRs, STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
AND THEnR ADMHNISTRATION (1964), and for municipal ordinances, RHYNE & RHYNE,
CiviL R IGHTS ORDINANCES 20-71 (1963).

68 Section 706(b).
69 Section 706(b) states only that no charge may be filed until sixty days have passed.
After sixty days, therefore, § 706(a)'s broad directive that the EEOC shall investigate
"whenever" a charge is properly filed is controlling.
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70

an authoritative statement of legislative intent indicate that concurrent
proceedings were anticipated in such circumstances. To construe the
act otherwise would render meaningless the section 70,6(e) provision
allowing a court, which can hear a case only after the Commission has
essayed voluntary settlement, to stay proceedings pending termination of
71
state or local efforts.
If the Commission is allowed to take a case when other proceedings
are pending, it should not be compelled to drop its investigation when a
decision is reached in the parallel procedure. Neither should a prior
decision by a state or local agency forestall the Commission from hearing a complaint. Even if it were clear that res judicata should apply to
administrative decisions, which it is not,72 frequent application of the
doctrine of res judicata seems inappropriate in this context because of
the lack of control that the complainant will usually have had over
the earlier state FEP proceedings.73 Therefore the effect to be given to
a prior administrative determination may be resolved on the basis of
expressions of legislative intent and fairness in particular cases. Although
slightly ambiguous, the language of section 706(b) appears to authorize
the Commission to enter a case before the sixty day period expires if
state or local proceedings have "terminated."74 The bill's floor manager
understood this section to authorize the Commission to act whether
"termination" had occurred by dismissal of the earlier complaint or by
decision on the merits.7 5 To decide otherwise would conflict with the
70 Representative Celler stated just before the substitute bill passed the House that
the EEOC could take a case after sixty days even if the state commission were nearing
an adjustment. Hearings Before the House Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1964).
71 The stay, moreover, may be for no longer than sixty days, indicating that Congress
not only anticipated but desired concurrent proceedings in certain situations.
72 See DAvis, TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LA-w § 18.02 (1958).
73 For a discussion of the effect of prior state court decisions upon the federal district
courts, see text at notes 182-89 infra, where it is argued that res judicata should not
apply. The Federal Commission will rarely if ever be confronted with a previous state
court decision on the same issue due to the fact that a complaint must be filed with it
within ninety days of the time it is brought to the notice of the state or local authority,
which is much too short a time for most state agencies to reach a decision and have
it judicially reviewed.
74 An unlikely alternative reading of 706(b) is that the clause "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated" acts on the entire subsection to forbid the filing of
a charge with the Commission if the case has already been decided on the state or local
level.

75 Senator Humphrey stated that if the grievant does not obtain satisfaction on the
state level, he can appeal to the EEOC, and went so far as to suggest that the EEOC
might then request the state agency to reconsider its decision. 110 CONG. REc. 14187
(1964). Humphrey's understanding was that the state agency would have two
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effort in the compromise bill to encourage strong state action by providing a federal remedy whenever state relief is inadequate; instead of
spurring enforcement of state fair employment laws, there would be
little to discourage state agencies from entering cursory decisions against
possibly deserving grievants.7 6 Such a result would reduce deferral to
de facto cession and make the complex deferral provisions redundant.
Refusal by the Commission to reconsider complaints upon which
state or local agencies have rendered decisions would be serious not
only because it would deny dissatisfied grievants the Commission's assistance in mediation but also because it would seem to deprive them
of the opportunity to sue in federal courts. 7 The same result would occur
when the Commission ceded its jurisdiction to state or local authorities. 78
Such commission action is virtually unreviewable, since the only standard
in title VII to guide the Commission is that grants ceding its authority
79
should be "in furtherance of . . . cooperative efforts."

The Department of Labor, apparently by grafting the standards required for sixty-day deferral onto the question of jurisdictional cession,
has announced that twenty-two states already have FEP statutes that
warrant relinquishment of EEOC jurisdiction.80 If, however, the standards for cession and for deferral were meant to be identical, the complex
deferral provisions would be surplusage. That this construction was not
intended is indicated by the presence of Commission authority to cede
its jurisdiction in the House bill 8l long before Senator Dirksen submitted
his amendments requiring deferral. Perhaps the most compelling argument against widespread cession is that the Commission's ability to
extend or to limit its jurisdiction 8 2 provides a powerful lever with which
practical alternatives open to it after sixty days: "to adjust the complaint or to
terminate proceedings on it." 110 CONG. Ric. 15866 (1964).
76 Many state FEP commissioners feel that although they must dismiss 50% of the
charges filed, a much higher percentage are legitimate. See Girard & Jaffe, Some
General Observations on Administration of State Fair Employment Practice Laws, 14
BUFFALO L. REv. 114, 118 (1964); Note, 74 HAv. L. REv. 526 (1961). Giving res judicata
effect to these dismissals would put even more pressure upon state agencies to
dismiss borderline cases in order to forestall federal intervention. If so, charges might
be investigated less adequately than they are at present, and encouragement of stronger
state and local FEP agencies, the policy underlying deferral, would be impaired.
77 Cf. §§ 706(e), 709(b).
78 Section 709(b).
79

Ibid.

80 56

LAB. Rr.

REP. 440 (1964); see also BUREAU oF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, STATE FAIR

EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION ii

(1964).

81 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 708(b) (1963).
82 The Commission's authority to rescind agreements ceding its jurisdiction at any
time gives it considerable maneuverability in inducing state and local agencies to
maintain high standards of enforcement. Section 709(b).
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to induce states and municipalities to build up their own FEP author83
ities to high levels of competence and effectiveness.
State and local agencies have made at most modest progress in eliminating discrimination by employers.8 4 They have exerted even less impact
upon discriminatory union practices.8 5 This slow progress is more a
result of chronic deficiency in staffing and financing than lack of enforcement power.8 6 It was in part for these reasons that five state FEPC
heads testified before the Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment to the need for parallel federal legislation.8 7 Not only will state
88
agencies and the Federal Commission be able to cooperate closely
89
and perhaps even to pool their finances, but also the threat of having
to account to two agencies may induce businessmen and labor leaders
to arrange to deal with only one.9 0 The power of the EEOC to condition
ceding its jurisdiction upon a showing that a state FEP agency is adequately financed could be a strong inducement for generally conservative
83 See text at notes 23-25 supra for analysis of how this inducement to state and
local activity was written into the act by the Dirksen amendments.
84 See NORGPEN & HILL 230. See generally id. at 114-48; Girard & Jaffe, supra
note 76, at 115; Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions,
14 BUFFALO L. Rav. 22 (1964).
85 See NORGREN & HILL 232; Hill, supra note 84, at 22. But for anti-discrimination
efforts being made by the national labor leadership, see Raskin, Civil Rights: The Law
and the Unions, The Reporter, Sept. 10, 1964, pp. 23-28.
86 See NORGREN 8- HIL 130, 266; Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-DiscriminationLegislation,74 HARv. L. REv. 526 (1961).
87 See 110 CONG. RaEC. 13080-81 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). Several of the
reasons cited to demonstrate why a concurrent federal law was necessary even in
northern states which already had enforceable FEP statutes go also to the disadvantages
of cession: Senator Humphrey emphasized the unequal coverage and effectiveness of
the various existing statutes, and the difficulties which state and local agencies had
encountered in policing interstate business operations. 110 CONG. REc. 6549-50 (1964).
See also NORGREN & HILL 333-34; Note, State FairEmployment PracticeActs and MultiState Employers, 36 NomaE DAME LAw. 189 (1961).
88 Section 709(b) authorizes the Commission to utilize the services and personnel of
state and local agencies if it can attain their consent.
89 Section 709(b) permits the Commission to reimburse state and local agencies for
services rendered. It has been suggested that the language allows the Federal Commission to pay state agencies for handling classes of cases over which it has relinquished
federal jurisdiction. See Berg, supra note 3, at 91-92. But the language of the statute
and its legislative history belie this suggestion. Although the powers to reimburse and
cede are in the same subsection, they are conferred in separate sentences which fail
to connote that the reimbursement power has been carried over into the cession
authority. In the House bill the two authorities were, in fact, in altogether separate
sections which operated only in mutually exclusive situations. See H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 708(b), 709(b) (1964).
90 One of the'most frequently voiced objections to the bill was that it would subject

businessmen to inconvenient record-keeping and unnecessary harassment by duplicate
authorities. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (additional
minority views of Representative Meader).
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lobbies in a state legislature to pressure for larger appropriations for the
state FEP agency.9 ' An alternative method of achieving the same result
would be for local companies to press for effective fair employment
ordinances in their own municipalities. 92 Such approaches would further
title VII's concern to encourage decentralized adaptation to regional
problems and experimentation with different methods of preventing
discrimination by enlisting voluntary effort within individual communi93
ties to achieve compliance with the law.

2. JurisdictionalConflict Between the EEOC and the NLRB. Troublesome jurisdictional overlap will occur if the NLRB continues to concern
itself with complaints of racial discrimination. By judicially-created
doctrine a labor union has a fiduciary duty to represent all employees
in its bargaining unit "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially,
and in good faith." 94 Delay and expense have discouraged private litigation,9 5 however, and commentators have urged the NLR.B to take jurisdiction over complaints of racial discrimination.906 Thus, it is argued that
the duty of fair representation derived from section 9(a) of the National
91 Conspicuously absent from the organizations which fought passage of the Civil
Rights Act were such major business lobbies as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce. See CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 21, 1964,
p. 366. This may be an indication that the larger companies, whose lobbying activities
can be particularly influential on the state level, no longer have an inordinate distrust
of FEP legislation. Since most businessmen would presumably rather deal with state
than federal officials, it may not be far-fetched to attempt to interest them in procuring
larger appropriations to state agencies.
92 At least one municipal FEP agency, in Philadelphia, has enjoyed substantial
success and should merit serious consideration when the Commission decides to which
agencies it will delegate its powers. See NORGREN & HELL 101-02, 111-13. For discussions
which touch upon possible home rule problems, see Rice & Greenberg, Municipal
Protection of Human Rights, 1952 Wis. L. Rav. 679; Note, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 526, 581-84
(1961).
93 See 110 CONG. Rac. 12580 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc.
13087 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
94 Steele v. Louisville 9- Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (Railway Labor
Act); cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (refusal to process grievances); Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam) (Fair Representation doctrine
applied to NLRA); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952)
(RLA).
95 So discouraging to grievants are considerations of delay and expense in litigation
that it has been estimated an average of less than one case a year has been brought
under the Fair Representation doctrine. See Spvern, Race Discrimination and the
National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH CONF.
ON LABOR 3, 7 (1963). See also Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. Rav. 547, 557-58
(1963); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1339 (1958).
96 See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vu.L. L. REv. 151, 172-73 (1957);
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L.
Rv. 563 (1962); Sovern, supra note 95, at 3.
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Labor Relations Act 97 can be read as implicit in section 7,98 the violation of which is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A). 99
Furthermore, until recently it was felt that the NLRA should "be exploited to its utmost"' 00 since prior to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act Congress had failed to provide an alternative remedy.
Although the Miranda decision' 01 foreshadowed the use of the NLRA
as a weapon against racial discrimination, not until the day before
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did the NLRB actually
find that racial discrimination constituted an unfair labor practice. A
unanimous Board held in Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool
Co.)1 ° 2 that a local's refusal to process a Negro's grievance was illegal
coercion of an employee in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). A three-mem1 3
ber majority went further and found a violation of section 8(b)(2)
because the union caused the company to discriminate against the employee and a violation of section 8(b)(3)104 because its failure to process
the grievance was a refusal to bargain collectively with the company.
That the NLRB will adhere to Independent Metal Workers despite the
passage of the Civil Rights Act is indicated by a subsequent decision in
which section 8(a)(3) was also relied upon to forbid racial discrimination
by an employer. 105
The General Counsel of the NAACP hailed the Independent Metal
Workers decision as a step forward of "almost revolutionary proportions"
for the civil rights movement. 106 But whereas the arguments for assump29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958): "Employees shall have the right . . . to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing."
99 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(a) (1958). See, e.g., Sovern, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 590-94 (1962).
100 Sovern, supra note 99, at 631.
101 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(1963); see note 113 infra.
102 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1964).
108 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958), making it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of [section 8(a)(3)] .... " Section 8(a)(3) in turn provides that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. 1964).
104 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1958): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
union or its agents- . . . (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees .... "
105 Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1964). Union
enforcement of a work distribution ratio between Negro and white locals and of a
"no doubling" arrangement forbidding white and Negro gangs from working together
was found by a unanimous Board also to violate §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2).
106 N.Y. Times, July 3, 1964, p. 1, col. 6 (quoting Robert L. Carter).
97
98
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tion of jurisdiction by the NLRB had formerly been based largely on
the contention that otherwise the grievant would have no effective redress at all, the current advantages are primarily procedural. Under
title VII a litigant may have to pay court costs and attorney's fees, 107 but
once a charge has been filed with the NLRB the Board will assume all
expenses. In addition, the NLRB, unlike the EEOC, can itself provide
an administrative remedy. Choice of the NLRB, despite the slowness of
its machinery, might in some cases bring quicker relief than that available under the time-consuming title VII procedure1 0s
The attractiveness to grievants of the NLRB alternative fails to support extended NLRB jurisdiction; Congress probably would not have
designed such elaborate procedures in title VII if it had expected them
to be frequently circumvented by the NLRB alternative. Although
technically NLRB jurisdiction over racial discrimination is protected
by the act,109 it was undoubtedly only because the NLRB had never
exercised such jurisdiction when the Civil Rights bill was being drafted
that the concurrency problem was not provided for.110 Even though
allowing NLRB jurisdiction would probably not result in pre-emption
of state and local agencies,"' conceivably the NLRB, already overbur107 The court-appointed attorney and waiver of costs provided by §§ 706(e) and
(k) is discretionary with the district judge.
108 The prediction was made even before the provisions for deferral were written
into title VII that grievants might have to wait over two years for relief. H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1963) (additional majority views of Representative Kastenmeier).
109 Technically § 1103, which protects existing rights of federal agencies, should
apply to NLRB jurisdiction over racial discrimination, even though it did not exist
when the bill was drafted and debated, because the Independent Metal Workers
decision was announced the day before the Civil Rights Act was finally signed into law.
110 One of the few Congressional references to the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction between the EEOC and the NLRB was a memorandum prepared for Senator
Clark by the Department of Justice which indicates how little foreseen was Independent
Metal Workers: "Nothing in title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and
obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. The procedures set up in
title VII are the exclusive means of relief against those practices of discrimination which
are forbidden as unlawful employment practices by sections 704 and 705 [subsequently
renumbered 703 and 704]. Of course, title VII is not intended to and does not deny to
any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and
State statutes. If a given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of
jurisdiction." 110 CONG. Rac. 7207 (1964).
111 Immediate NLRB jurisdiction could conceivably create a problem with the
state and local authorities protected by title VII, for the Supreme Court has carefully
protected the NLRB by pre-empting state authority in broadly defined areas of Board
competence. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see
generally Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor
Relations, 59 CoLum. L. RFv. 6, 269 (1959). If alternative access to the NLRB meant
that grievants complained directly to the Board, state and local agencies could be
prevented from exercising the jurisdiction supposedly guaranteed them for at least
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dened with a backlog of charges, would find itself flooded with cases
outside its area of special competence while relatively few complaints
trickled into the EEOC or state and local agencies. The NAACP has in
fact advised grievants to complain directly to the NLRB rather than to
1 12

the EEOC.

Practical considerations aside, judicial reaction indicates that by reading section 8 to forbid racial discrimination the NLRB has exceeded its
statutory authority. 113 It has been persuasively argued that the weight of
authority in the cases and legislative history demonstrates that sections
8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) refer solely to discrimination resulting from union
activity.114 The Board's technique of reading the section 9 right to fair
representation into section 7 has also been questioned, for legislative
intent and twenty-nine years of history' give little support to this interpretation of the statute." 5
A supplementary tactic utilized by the Board in Independent Metal
Workers was to revoke the union's certification. Such action, which the
sixty days by sections 706(b) and (c). But state jurisdiction has been permitted to
prevail in the past where a "compelling state interest" was at stake. Violent conduct
and mass picketing, for example, are subject to state regulation even when such
actions/are unfair labor practices. Protection of its citizens' civil rights might also be
considered a "compelling state interest." Cf. Meltzer, supra. The Garmon rule preempting state courts depends in part on the argument that they should not be
permitted to interfere with "conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation ... [under the NLRA]." 359 U.S. at 244. In title VII there is, however, the
clearly expressed intent that state jurisdiction should not be unnecessarily dislodged.
Hence the NLRB should definitely not be permitted to pre-empt state and local
FEP agencies.
112 N.Y. Times, July 3, 1964, p. 1, col. 6. There has, however, been no immediate
increase in the volume of complaints of racial discrimination filed with the NLRB. 57
LAB. RYL. R . 183 (1964).
113 In Miranda Fuel Co., where racial discrimination was not in issue, the NLRB
found that any "hostile" union action against one of its members "for irrelevant,
unfair, or invidious reasons" constitutes an unfair labor practice. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185
(1962). In an atmosphere charged by the recognition that such a rule could be
directed against racial discrimination, the Second Circuit denied enforcement. NLRB v.
Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (1963). Consequently the question of whether the
NLRB should redress racial discrimination under §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(2) is only one
aspect of a major definitional problem, which will probably not be resolved until the
limits of the Board's jurisdiction are clarified by the Supreme Court. But in a case in
which it need not have even mentioned Miranda, the Supreme Court went out of its
way to state that it was reserving the NLRB's arguments in Miranda for later
consideration. Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 696
0
n.7 (1962).
114 See Comment, Discrimination and the NLRB: The Scope of Board Power under
Sections 8(aX3) and 8(bX2), 32 U. Cml. L. REv. 124, 136-141 (1964); Note, Administrative
Enforcement of the Right to Fair Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 711, 718-25 (1964).
115 See Note, supra note 114, at 716-25; Note, 78 HALv. L. REv. 679 (1965). But see
note 96 supra; Comment, Racial Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation,
65 COLUm. L. R-v. 273 (1965); Note, 42 TExAs L. Rav. 917 (1964).
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Board had frequently threatened in the past, 116 seems dearly authorized
if the offending union fails to conform to the standards imposed by
section 9 for certification. 11.7 Should the Attorney General fail to prosecute under section 707, or should a supplementary sanction against a
recalcitrant union be needed, decertification by the Board might well
be useful. Its general efficacy, however, is questionable because many
unions are uncertified and because many labor organizations, particularly
craft unions and those in the building trades, are not dependent on
NLRB certification procedure for maintenance of their representative
status: employers would often continue to be under a duty to bargain
118
merely because such unions enjoy majority support.
In the area of civil rights, Board regulation is peripheral at best. If
the NLRB continues to assert jurisdiction, tlerefore, state and local
agencies should not be pre-empted. Arbitration proceedings under the
NLRA provide an analogy: 119 the NLRB should require complaints first
to be referred to state and local agencies, and next to the EEOC. If the
complainant perseveres, or if the EEOC enlists its assistance, the NLR.B
might then respond, utilizing such weapons as decertification and institution of closed shop complaints against unions which exclude Negroes.
Although the NLRB can play a useful role in the eradication of racial
discrimination, it should be a supplementary one at a late stage in the
20
enforcement process.1
3. Concurrency Among Agencies: A Summary. The Commission should
be able to make a significant contribution to the effort to eliminate employment discrimination by cooperating with other agencies and serving
as a national FEP clearing-house. Possibilities for cooperation with the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity provide a
good example of how what might otherwise be wasteful duplication can
be turned to good advantage.
The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, first
created by executive order in 1941 and since continued on slightly
116 Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 53 (1962) (dictum); A. 0. Smith, 119 N.L.R.B. 621
(1957); Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955) (union refused to bargain
for non-union employees in bargaining unit); Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318
(1953); Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945) (dictum) (union confined Negroes in
bargaining unit to separate, uncertified local); Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944).
117 See Sovern, supra note 99, at 594-604; Comment, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 273, 284-87
(1965).
118 See NORGREN & HILL 217; Sovern, supra note 95; Comment, 50 VA. L. Rav. 1221,
1222-23 (1964).
119 See Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 455-57 (1957).
120 In most instances the EEOC will have made at least initial efforts at voluntary
settlement before the NLRA's six month statute of limitations has run. Cf. § 706(d).
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revised bases by subsequent administrations, 1' 1 covers approximately one
quarter of all persons working in non-agricultural industries. 12 2 It is
empowered to terminate the government contracts of employers whom it
has found to have discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion or
national origin. 123 It may also publish the names of non-complying
12 4
contractors and disqualify them from future government contracts.
The Commission and the President's Committee can complement one
another's activities in miny ways; for example, a suggestion by the Commission that it will refer a case involving a government contractor to
the President's Committee with a recommendation that the Committee
impose all sanctions at its disposal would be a forceful lever in the
conciliation effort. But, the Justice Department, apparently impressed by
the fact that much of the coverage of the President's Committee will
be duplicated by title VII, has announced that the Committee will probably be phased out of existence by 1968.125 The potential future efficacy
of the Committee suggests, however, that it should be retained. There
are, indeed, specific references to it in title VII which apparently presuppose its continuing existence. 2 6
Although jurisdictional overlap may sometimes cause troublesome
friction between agencies, proliferation of agencies is not, in general, to
be discouraged. Agencies should often be able to cooperate to good
advantage; hence the EEOC should make use of the special resources
offered by the President's Committee and the NLRB to lend credibility
to its efforts as mediator. In the interest of coherent administration
on the federal level, individual complaints should first be referred
to the EEOC. The EEOC should also be chary of dispersing its authority
to any but the most effective state and local FEP agencies, for its very
presence, weak as the Commission is, will serve as a catalyst to stronger
121 See generally NORGREN & HILL 148-79; Powers, Federal Procurement and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 468 (1964).
122 Coverage has been variously estimated at between 15 and 18 million employees.
See NORGREN & HILL 153 n.6, citing U.S. Dept. of Labor statistics; Powers, supra note
121, at 484-85.
123 A clause forbidding discrimination is written into all government contracts.
See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (federal government entitled to do
business with contractors and suppliers on its own terms).
.24 Cf. Exec. Orders No. 10925, 26 F.R. 1977 (1961), No. 11114, 28 F.R. 6485 (1963).
125 Statement by Assistant Attorney General Marshall as quoted in 57 LAB. REL,

REP. 182 (1964).
3.26 Sections 709(d) (records required under Exec. Order No. 10925, creating Kennedy
Committee, need not be duplicated for EEOC), 716(c) (President's Committee members
to be invited to attend coordinating conference; see text at note 128 infra). See also
§ 701(b) (proviso directing President to "utilize his existing authority" to prevent
discrimination in federal employment).
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state and local enforcement. Informal working arrangements should be
sufficient to eliminate unnecessary duplication of agency effort; 2 7 to this
end the national conference which title VII directs the President to convene should be held as soon as possible to initiate efforts to achieve co128
ordinated administration.
II.

ENFORCEMENT

BY THE EXECUTIVE

When the EEOC was stripped of its enforcement powers, a compromise gave the Attorney General authority to intervene in private suits
and to initiate civil actions.'29 Thus the Justice Department now possesses
many of the powers originally vested in the Commission.
The sole condition imposed upon the Attorney General's intervention
in individual suits is that he certify cases to be of "general public importance."' 30 Since "public importance" is an imprecise qualification,
courts may usually be expected to grant a request to intervene. 13 ' The
EEOC is authorized to "advise, consult and assist"'132 the Attorney
General in the litigation and to permit him access to the results of its
investigation. 33 Although the case is to be docketed by the federal district court as an ordinary civil suit, 3 4 the Attorney General's intervention

will assist the plaintiff by shifting the burden of litigation from his
shoulders.135
'27 The courts have in fact been disinclined to interfere in jurisdictional disputes
between federal agencies. Cf. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 871 U.S.
156, 172-74 (1962).
128 Section 716(c). Vice-President Humphrey has been appointed coordinator of the
government's civil rights programs. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1964, p. 1, col. 6. Subsequently
a coordinating Council on Equal Opportunity, which Humphrey is to head, has been
created by executive order, 58 LAB. REL. RE'. 139 (1965).
129 The arrangement was generally regarded as a quid pro quo which, although
weakening the enforcement of the bill, made some concession to the bill's liberal
supporters. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1964); 110 CONG. REc. 14220 (1964).
130 Section 706(e).
131 "Public importance" for a case might take the form of creating judicial precedent
or merely of breaking a pattern of discrimination in a particular industry. The
Attorney General's certification will nevertheless be subject to review by the court,
which "in its discretion" may refuse to permit intervention. Section 706(e). Congressional understanding was that such intervention would generally be allowed. See,
e.g., Hearings Before the Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 21,

25-26 (1964).
Section 705(g)(6).
See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
134 Sections 706(e)-(f). There is no expediting provision or opportunity for a threejudge court in private suits under § 706.
135 Although § 706(e) permits the district court to appoint an attorney and to allow
the action to begin without payment of fees, costs or security, the exercise of such
power is discretionary and will probably be infrequent in some districts. Consequently
132
133
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More importantly, "whenever" the Attorney General "has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights
secured by this title"' 3 6 he may bring a civil action himself. The procedural requirements placed upon the Attorney General in such suits are
the least onerous in title VII. "Whenever," by its plain meaning, indicates
that he need not wait for state or federal administrative remedies to be
exhausted. 1 7 A difficult hurdle will be to show that he has "reasonable
cause to believe" the requisite violations exist, 38 for if he cannot demonstrate this his complaint will be summarily dismissed. 3 9 Since he will
generally have to allege a number of distinct acts to support his belief
that a "pattern or practice" exists, tactically it might be easiest for a
defendant to win his case on the pleadings. 140 But it should not be
necessary to allege very many distinct elements to indicate the probable
existence of a "pattern or practice." The language of the act specifies that
"pattern or practice" was meant to encompass a series of discriminatory
acts by a single individual;' 4 ' the use of "practice" makes it arguable,
a plaintiff may risk substantial expense if he undertakes litigation himself. Even if
the court appoints an attorney and delays court costs, there will be miscellaneous
expenses difficult for an unemployed grievant to bear. An award of costs may
include a reasonable attorney's fee, but of course this will be available only to the
prevailing party. Section 706(k).
136 Section 707(a).
137 Senator Humphrey's understanding confirms this reading: "There is no requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to exercise of this authority by
the Attorney General and there is no requirement of prior referral to Federal, State or
local agencies, though the Attorney General would remain free to make such referral
if he deemed it useful." 110 CONG. REc. 12724 (1964); see also Hearings Before the
House Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1964) (memorandum
submitted by Representative McCulloch).
138 The stipulation that the Attorney General must find "resistance to full enjoyment" apparently is legislative gloss. It means "no more than refusal to comply with
titles II or VII of the act: that is, engaging in any prohibited discrimination." 110
CONG. RFc.15895 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler).
139 The bill's floor manager in the House thought otherwise: "the statute contains
the usual directive to the Attorney General that he should have a reasonable case
before he sues, but of course, he-not the court--decides whether reasonable cause
exists, and the issue of reasonable cause does not present a separate litigable issue."
110 CONG. Ric. 15895 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler).
140 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, dispense with fact pleading for
the minimal requirement that there'be "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Hence the
defendant's motion for dismissal under rule 12(b) would have to be predicated upon
the Attorney General's failure to state "a claim upon which relief can be granted,"
and once an allegation of a discriminatory pattern or practice is made a court is
unlikely to dismiss. Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Dioguardi v.
Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
141 Section 707 refers to "any person or group of persons," envisaging both individual and class actions.
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although unlikely, that one act involving the participation of several individuals might also be included. 142 How many instances may be necessary to establish a pattern or practice is, however, unclear; 143 it may be
justifiable to read into "pattern or practice," when taken with the verb
"is engaged," a requirement that the conduct have been regular and
144
continued over a period of time.
The Attorney General's initiation of a civil action brings with it
advantages which are not available in private suits. The case can be
heard by a three-judge court, 145 which may be all but essential to success
in some southern districts. 146 The case must also be "in every way expedited,"' 47 a particularly compelling consideration for those grievants
who are unemployed. 148 Accordingly, if the Attorney General, upon the
recommendation of the EEOC, plans to intervene in a case if it is privately brought, the Justice Department might consider initiating the case
itself instead. This approach would guarantee a grievant immunity from
attorney's fees or court costs, which a judge might impose in a private
action. 49 For many individuals such procedural advantages will outweigh the probability that only impersonal relief in the form of a general
prohibitory injunction will be granted in a suit initiated by the Attorney
142 Such a construction would give "practice" a meaning distinct from "pattern"
and so prevent its being considered surplusage. It is arguable that the word "practice"
is used in § 707 as a term of art identical to "unlawful employment practice" but
its usage here in conjunction with "pattern" suggests that the collective meaning was
intended.
143 Congressional comment confirms the obvious limitation that the Attorney General
will be unable to sue a single firm for an "isolated or sporadic act." 110 CONG. REC.
15895 (1964) (remarks of Representative Celler); 110 CONG. REc. 14239, 14270 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Humphrey).
144 Such descriptive adjectives as "repeated," "regular," and "consistent" were frequently used to qualify the scope of § 707 in congressional debate. See, e.g., 110 CONG.
REc. 14239, 14270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
145 Section 707(b). The section is identical with § 206, which was derived in turn
from 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958) (civil antitrust). Whether to resort to a three-judge court is
entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General; the chief judge of the court of
appeals designates a panel immediately upon receipt of the Attorney General's request.
146 See Wulf, A Crucial Court, The New Leader, Feb. 15, 1965, p. 12; Note, Judicial
Performance in the Fifth Circuit,73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963).
147 Section 707(b). The expediting clause applies even if the Attorney General does
not request a three-judge court.
148 The expediting provision was inserted in full recognition of the major problem
posed by judicial delay, as Representative Celler explained when stating the rationale
for an identical clause in title II: "Some judges in the South on ... civil rights cases...
are dragging their feet." 118 CONG. REc. 1535 .(1964). For a detailed description of how a
federal district judge can discourage any but the most determined plaintiff by
consistently finding grounds for procedural delays, see Judge Mize's handling of
Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963), reported in
BARRE-rt, INTEGRATION AT OLE MISS (1965).
149 Section 706(e). See note 135 supra.
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General; this would be particularly true when, for example, a grievant
has applied repeatedly for a job with a company and thinks that threat of
a contempt citation might change an employer's hiring policy. It
may sometimes be in an individual's interest immediately to bring
his complaint to the attention of the Attorney General, for he might
thereby avoid the delay necessitated by the Commission's mandatory
deferral and conciliation process.
If it becomes the practice for the courts to grant direct relief to an
individual when the Attorney General has successfully prosecuted a civil
action, grievants will benefit substantially. The statute authorizes the
Attorney General to request "such relief, including ... a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order or other order . .. as he deems
necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described."'150
"Other orders" might be interpreted to include orders to hire and reinstate specific individuals. 151 Since reparation is within the equitable
jurisdiction,152 the phrase might also encompass awards of back pay. 153
Furthermore, the omission of "preventive" in describing the relief available in section 707, which otherwise conforms precisely to section 206
upon which it was modeled, may indicate congressional intent to give
the courts powers of redress when the Attorney General sues under
section 707.
Practical considerations may, however, dissuade courts from granting
direct relief to grievants who are not formal parties to the Attorney
General's suit. For example, ordering an employer to hire a specific individual may be unnecessary if he has in the interim found another job,
but without introducing peripheral issues the court could not properly explore his current status.154 Hence a convenient procedure might be for the
aggrieved individual to join or even to intervene in the Attorney General's
suit. This tactic could be disallowed on the ground that such intervention might hamper the Attorney General in conducting the case' 55
150 Section 707(a).
'51

Cf. 110 CONM. Rc. 15874-75 (1964).

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 895 (1946).
A provision delineating identical decrees in the Emergency Price Control Act
has been held to authorize a court order to repay illegally collected rent. Ibid.
152
'53

154 A Connecticut court in this situation refused to order an employer to hire a

specific individual, but did order the employer not to discriminate against the same
applicant if he applied again. Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (Super.
Ct. 1950).
155 See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 11
F.R.D. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (dictum), where intervention in the Attorney General's antitrust suit was denied, the court stating that sound public policy requires the government
to be free from interference by private citizens when it litigates in the public interest.
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or unduly delay the original suit. 156 In addition the act provides a
specific alternative course for an individual to pursue if he desires
relief. 157 Other policies, however, favor intervention. The requirement
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the applicant's claim and
the main action have a question in common' 58 would seem to have been
met if the individual claims that the same pattern or practice of discrimination alleged by the Attorney General was directed in part against him.
With this pre-condition satisfied, considerations of judicial economy,
such as avoiding a multiplicity of suits, disposing of the complete controversy existing between the parties, and saving time consumed in trials,
support intervention. 159
Whether or not private individuals are permitted direct relief under
section 707, the Department of Justice retains significant enforcement
power. Implicit in the wording "pattern or practice," and in section
707 in general, is the expectation that the Attorney General will combat
illegal discrimination on the wide-ranging basis successfully adopted by
several state FEP agencies. 160 In conjunction with the EEOC the Attorney
General will be able to initiate broad investigations and enforcement
proceedings. But all of this power is discretionary with the Attorney
General: whether title VII is effectively enforced will therefore depend
largely upon the policy which the Executive adopts on civil rights.

III.

ENFORCEMENT BY THE JUDICIARY

Substantial litigation under title VII may be anticipated; the small
amount which has arisen from state FEP statutes 161 provides an unreliable
156 Ibid.
157 See United States v. 1830.62 Acres of Land in Botetourt County, 51 F. Supp.
158 (WM.D. Va. 1943) (intervention may be denied whenever applicant has potential
remedy in another action).
158 FED. R. Cirv. P. 24(b).
159 For a much quoted statement of the above-mentioned policies, see Shipley v.
Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870, 876-77 (W.D. Pa. 1947), where the plaintiff
sued for compensation and the applications of eighty-seven others to intervene were
granted. See also Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502, 506
(1941), where Mr. Justice Frankfurter upheld intervention in an anti-trust case when
"the enforcement of a public law also demands distinct safeguarding of private
interests by giving them a formal status in the decree." Intervention has been permitted even when the intervener had no direct personal or pecuniary interest in the
litigation. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); cf.
Textile Workers v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (alternative
holding).
160 See Hearings Before the House Committee on Rules on HR. 7152, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 238 (1964) (comparison by Representative McCulloch of nearly identical provision in § 206 to powers of the Attorney General under antitrust acts).
161 In the twelve states with the most effective FEP laws only eighteen court actions
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index since Congress departed from prior experience by weakening the
administrative remedy and making de novo trials available to grievants.
Experience under the Fair Representation doctrine indicates, however,
that if the courts do not liberally exercise their statutory discretion to
waive court costs and appoint attorneys, private parties will be discouraged from bringing suits; 162 but even so, suits brought by the Attorney
General should account for a fair amount of litigation.
Since cases will generally be heard by judges sitting without juries in
their equitable jurisdiction, 163 the enforcement of title VII has been thrust
squarely upon the federal judiciary. Furthermore, the success of the title
will hinge largely upon judicial determinations of the extent of the
jurisdiction to be assumed by the federal courts and the nature of evidence considered to be probative, as well as the versatility of the judicial
approach to the granting of relief. Because relevant precedent is scarce,
the courts must fashion a new body of federal case law with but imperfect analogies in such areas as labor-management relations to guide them.
Approaches adopted by state FEP commissions and decisions of state
courts in their review will hence carry weight if only because that
experience will often be directly in point. 64
A. Prerequisites for Judicial Intervention
Most fair employment cases that are heard by federal district courts
will have first been referred to the EEOC in an effort to achieve volunresulted from the" 19,384 complaints filed before 1961. H.R.
2d Sess. 6 (1962).

REP.

No. 1370, 87th Cong.,

162 See note 95 supra.
163 Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
164 Decisions of state courts have been shaped largely by procedures followed on the
administrative level, since they have generally limited their review to "whether the
findings are, upon the entire record, supported by evidence so substantial that from it
an inference of the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably." Holland
v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 88, 44, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954); see also Lesniak v. FEPC,
864 Mich. 495, 504, 111 N.W.2d 790, 795 (1961), where legislative authorization of trial
de novo was struck from the statute on the ground that it was inconsistent with the
"elaborate machinery to perform a specific administrative and quasi-judicial function"
also created by the statute. Since state courts have not originated the procedures
devised, when federal suits are heard de novo the judiciary may accord even less weight
to state precedent than they generally give to state law. But since the procedures
worked out are experimental techniques in a very new area which offers few guidelines upon which to rely, the federal courts may well, by observing state agency and
judicial experience, learn from error if not from intelligent precedent. For useful
summaries of state FEP litigation see Note, The Operation of State Fair Employment
Commissions, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 685 (1955); Note, Anti-Discrimination Commissions, 8
RACE REL. L. REP. 1085 (1958); Note, Employment Discrimination,5 R.cE RmL. L. REP.
569 (1960); and for a survey which has periodically been revised, Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d
1138 (1955).
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tary compliance with the law. If after sixty days the EEOC has been
unable to achieve conciliation, 10 5 the grievant is entitled to bring a civil
action; 166 but the suit must be brought in the judicial district where the
alleged practice was committed, where relevant employment records are
kept, or where the grievant would have worked had he received the
employment desired. 67 Most actions brought by the Attorney General
will also have originated in the Commission and will presumably be
subject to similar jurisdictional requirements. 168
Any person who can claim to have been aggrieved is entitled to sue. 169
Since "person" is broadly defined to include one or more individuals,
associations, and unincorporated organizations, 170 even a group should
have standing to sue if it can demonstrate that it has been injured.' 71
Whether class actions are permissible is unclear; both section 706(g),
which envisages injunctions broader than a specific order to hire, 1'7 2 and
the traditional considerations of judicial economy and convenience to
165 Section 706(e) permits the court to stay proceedings an additional sixty days
pending state, local or EEOC proceedings. Whether a motion for such a stay by the
defendant can be honored, or whether it must be made by the agency in question, is
unclear: the language says "upon request" but fails to delineate by whom.
166 Section 706(e).
167 Section 706(f). Only if the respondent is not found in any of the three districts
may the action be brought where he has his principal office. Thus forum shopping is
curtailed.
168 Section 707(a) states that the Attorney General "may bring a civil action in the
appropriate district of the United States." Although it is not certain, the word
"appropriate" presumably refers back to § 706(f). See note 167 supra.
169 The statute refers variously to "person aggrieved" and "person claiming to be
aggrieved." See §§ 706(a)-(e). Use of the latter term to describe who can sue may indicate that claimants should generally be given a trial on the merits without careful
scrutiny of their qualifications for standing; "person aggrieved" has received broad
construction in prior FEPC experience. See Note, 68 HARV. L. Rav. 685, 689 (1955).
The juxtaposition and apparent interchangeability of the two terms seem to indicate
that no distinction was intended and that standing requirements should be liberally
construed.
170

Section 701(a).

See Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); American Jewish Congress v. Hill,
1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 971 (1956) (N.Y. FEPC interpretation of "person aggrieved" to
include organization).
172 Individual relief is embodied in the clause permitting orders of "affirmative
action," whereas the authorization to "enjoin . . . from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice" seems to include broader injunctions to benefit persons other
than the original litigant. See also § 706(i), authorizing the Commission to sue to
compel compliance with any order issued in an individual's suit under § 706(e); if the
court order affected solely the original grievant, he could be expected to return to court
for its enforcement and so § 706(i) would be needless. There would be far more
reason for intervention by the Commission to see that an order was enforced if it
concerned a class of individuals similarly situated.
171
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litigants? 3 suggest it is feasible to use them. Even if class actions are
not permitted, an individual plaintiff might successfully request a court
order framed broadly enough to benefit others than himself. 174 In any
case, elimination by a Dirksen amendment of the right to bring a suit
"on behalf of" an injured individual 175 should not prove restrictive: an
organization will still be able to shoulder much of the burden of prosecution if the injured party is the nominal plaintiff.
Apparently an individual grievant will have access to the federal courts
only after having applied for assistance to the Commission. Nevertheless
the understanding of the bill's floor manager in the Senate was that "the
individual may proceed [to the courts] in his own right at any time. He
may take his complaint to the Commission, he may bypass the Commission, or he may go directly to court."'176 Only if the plaintiff's theory
is in tort with only collateral reference to the statute' 77 is this interpretation likely to prevail. Otherwise the fact that the act on its face provides
for litigation only after elaborate conciliation procedures indicates that
Congress did not intend grievants to have immediate access to the courts.
But for thirty days after the Commission has notified him that it was
unable to achieve a voluntary settlement, 178 the grievant has "an absolute
right to go into court" which exists regardless of Commission approval. 179
There will be temptation to cut into this "absolute right" if a state authority has reached a decision on the same charge before the grievant
files in federal court. Principles of comity, which usually prevent parallel
actions in different jurisdictions between the same parties, would seem
to suggest that the federal courts should dismiss the complaint.8 9 Considerations of judicial economy and prevention of harassment bolster
this interpretation. Finally, fulfillment of title VII's purpose might be
, 173 If

a class action is allowed, discrimination found, and a court order issued,
members of the class would have only to establish violation of the court order to
enforce their rights. See 3 MooaR, FEDEaur. PRAcTIcE §§ 23.03, 23.04 (2d ed. 1964);
Note, Class Actions: A Study of Group Interest Litigation, I RAcE REL. L. REP. 991

(1956).
174 Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
910 (1964).
175 H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(a) (1964); see Hearings Before the House
Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1964) (memorandum submitted by Representative McCulloch).
176 110 CONG. REc. 14188 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
177 See text at notes 241-46 infra.
178

Section 706(e).

Cf. § 706(e); see 110 CONG. REc. 14191 (1964) (remarks of Senator Javits); Hearings
Before the House Committee on Rules on H. Res. 789, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964)
(remarks of Representative Celler).
180 Cf., e.g., Dan v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1950), overruled by Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 419-20, 435 (1963); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897).
179
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curtailed if state agencies failed to exert their most strenuous efforts
because they felt that impending federal action impaired the atmosphere
necessary for adjustment.
In any conventional procedural situation these arguments would be
compelling. In this instance there is, however, a danger that a grievant
who has been required to apply first to a state agency for relief will be
frozen into the earlier procedure with little chance of adequately satisfying his claim. In most states a grievant has little control over his case;' 8 '
the FEP agency investigates his complaint and handles subsequent prosecution. 82 Since title VII requires preliminary solicitation of state agency
assistance the plaintiff cannot be said to have chosen the remedy initially
sought. Given such a situation, perhaps it is fortunate that comity is a
creature of judicial discretion. 83 Indeed, conflicting judgments and
parallel remedies in identical causes of action have been upheld in
184
other areas of the law.
The need to rehear a case will be most clear-cut when the state law in
question differs substantively or procedurally from the federal. 8 5 For
example, some state laws do not authorize monetary compensation as a
remedy; 8s it would be anomalous to deny a grievant what might rightfully be his under the federal law because the act requires temporary deferral to the state. A plaintiff might also be severely prejudiced if state
law did not afford assistance written into title VII, such as court-appointed counsel.
Complaints that, by permitting a second trial, federal courts are subjecting employers and unions to unfair harassment can be vitiated by
refusing to grant a plaintiff double relief for the same injury 87 Futhermore, it can be argued that two suits are justified because the alleged
action has violated two distinct laws;' 8 8 on a federally-created cause of
action a grievant deserves a federal hearing even if state laws cover the
same transaction. Finally, title VII not only anticipates the possibility
181 See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940) (dictum); Boeing
Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge, 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950),
aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951).
182 See Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526 (1961).
183 Cf. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 166 (1938).
184

See generally Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71

HARv.

L. REv. 513 (1958).
185 Cf. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928);
MENTS §§ 61-67 (1941).

see also

RESTATEMENT, JuDG-

186 See, e.g., WIs. ANN. STAT. tit. 13, § 111.36 (Supp. 1965).
187 Note, supra note 184, at 523-24.
188 See, for an analogy in criminal law where the disadvantages to the defendant are
more acute, the "dual sovereignty" doctrine as expressed in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359

U.S. 121 (1959).
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that parallel actions may be brought simultaneously, but also expressly
forbids federal courts to stay proceedings more than sixty days in such
circumstances. 8 9
B. Problems in Proof of Discrimination
The standards required for proof of discrimination will substantially
determine how effectively the rights secured by title VII are enforced.
On the one hand, certain unlawful actions will be on their face indistinguishable from perfectly legal conduct. On the other, conduct motivated by legitimate business considerations may fall within the broad
prohibitory language of the statute since any action taken even partially' 90 "because of . . . race, color, religion, sex or national origin"

will in theory violate the act. 191 Hence to determine governing standards
of proof the courts must strike a delicate balance between protecting the
innocent defendant and enabling the legitimate grievant to obtain relief
without undue difficulty. The problems of proof are exacerbated
by the fact that the conduct proscribed is vaguely defined, even though
the area of activity in question involves sensitive issues of traditional
management decision-making. The nature of these problems makes it
impossible to define comprehensive evidentiary rules; certain guidelines
may be suggested, but even these must be flexibly applied. The critical
factor will always be the situation sense of the trier of fact.
The simplest method of establishing discrimination will be to show
that the defendant himself has indicated that one of the forbidden criteria motivated his action. 192 State experience has shown, however, that
this method will not often be available; once the sanctions of the law
become known, discrimination will seldom be evinced by either word or
193
personal conduct.
1. Proof of Intent. Title VII differs from most state FEP statutes, moreover, because it explicitly requires proof of intent to discriminate. 194 This
stipulation was incorporated into the bill late in the Senate debate when
amendments to the wording of sections 70 6 (g) and 707 were offered from
189 Section 706(e).
190 An attempt to insert "solely" before "because of such individual's race, color,"

etc., in § 703 was unsuccessful. 110 CONG. REc. 13838 (1964) (amendment offered by
Senator McClellan).
191 Sections 703(a), (b), (c).
192 Manifestation of a hostile attitude toward an employee or deprecatory comments
about a plaintiff's race would be sufficient. Cf. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119
N.E.2d 581 (1954), where evidence that an employment agent had asked if a job applicant had changed her name and on being told, had commented, "What sort of a name
is that?" afforded inference of discrimination.
193 Cf. Note, 74 HARv. L. REV. 526 (1961).
194 Sections 706(g), 707.
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the floor. 19 5 The additions were accepted only because the bill's sponsors
understood them to be surplusage since section 703 defines an unlawful
employment practice as an action taken "because of" the forbidden
considerations. 19 6 Although intent may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, 197 difficulties will arise in determining in which cases the inference is justifiable. Plainly intent can sometimes be inferred from the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff.198 When the defendant's action is
neutral, as when the plaintiff is one among many applicants denied a
job, other extrinsic evidence such as that of an apparently discriminatory
hiring pattern can provide the inference, although the specific circumstances of the act may not alone permit it. Hence proof of intent might
cease to be, in practice, a separate element necessary to the plaintiff's
case. 199 Any other solution would require that a plaintiff, whose knowledge of the defendant's affairs and motivation will usually be severely
limited, carry an impossibly onerous burden and might well contravene
200
the broad remedial policy of the act.

The intent requirement may serve a valuable function as an affirmative
defense, for even if the plaintiff has been subjected to de facto discrimination the defendant should prevail if he can prove that the discrimination
was not purposeful. 2 01 Such a defense, however, will necessarily depend
195 110 CONG. RFc. 12723-24 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).

196 Ibid.
197 See, e.g., ibid.
198 Of course if specific intent is proved, violation can be found even if a discriminatory purpose cannot be inferred. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28
(1963).
199 The development of the treatment of intent under the labor statute may provide
a parallel. Although the act does not on its face require it, the Supreme Court has
frequently declared that intent is a necessary element of proof of a § 8(a)(3) violation.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra note 198; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
However, the Court has also held that "proof of certain types of discrimination
satisfies the intent requirement. This recognition that specific proof of intent is
unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union
membership is but an application of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend
the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17, 45 (1954). For similar language in a more recent case, cf. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961). As a result, the intent requirement has
become so diluted that it no longer constitutes an obstacle to a charging party's case.
See generally Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 124, 126-30 (1964).
200 Cf. Judge Fuld's perception of the innate difficulties involved: "One intent on
violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected to declare or announce
his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in
ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive . . . " Holland v. Edwards, 307
N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1954). See also Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co., 112
Ind. App. 336, 344, 41 N.E.2d 819, 821-22 (1942).
201 If the requirement of intent had not been added to the bill a strong case could
have been made that since the statute's general policy is remedial and preventive,
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largely upon what estimate is made of the defendant's credibility. The
traditional problems attendant upon use of character and similar fact
evidence will be present; the decision of the trier of fact on such issues
will be difficult to review on appeal. 202 Because of the discretion accorded
to the court of first impression, defendants will often be well advised
not to base their cases entirely on intent but to bring in other issues
as well.
2. Proof by the Attorney General:Pattern or Practice.When the Attorney General initiates a suit he must prove the existence of a "pattern or
practice of discrimination. '203 The most persuasive approach will be for
him to submit evidence of several distinct acts of discrimination and
thereafter to allege that these constitute a "pattern or practice." 204 But
the act would also seem to permit use of evidence of statistical probability
to infer the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
When Negroes in considerable number have applied to an employer
and all have been rejected while whites have simultaneously been hired,
use of probability evidence might afford a strong inference of discrimination on the assumption that at least one of the Negroes would have been
as qualified as one of the whites. When possible variable factors are few
in number, as in questions of work conditions or discharges, the inference
that a pattern of discrimination exists is especially strong. The courts
have, for example, relied heavily on probability evidence to find a constitutional violation when a pattern of wages lower for Negro school
teachers than for white was established, 205 and the NLRB has found a
heavy inference of anti-union discrimination when the proportion of
union members laid off exceeded the proportion existing in the group
20 6
from which selection was made.
But evidence of statistical disproportion in a work force or union does
rather than punitive, relief for the plaintiff would be appropriate even for unintended
violations. See Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954). But because of
the amendment, if a defendant can prove affirmatively that the discrimination alleged
was not purposeful the decision should be in his favor even if discrimination did in
fact occur. Section 713(b) also provides that a good faith reliance on Commission
regulations is a bar to a subsequent action.
202 Appellate court reluctance to interfere with credibility determinations under
the NLRA may provide an analogy. Cf. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 368 U.S. 810

(1961).
See text at notes 141-44 supra for discussion of "pattern or practice."
As this would probably necessitate putting several complaining witnesses on the
stand, proof of discrimination against them might well entail the problems which will
confront an individual who brings a case himself. See text at notes 213-29 infra.
205 Freeman v. County School Bd., 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948); Davis v. Cook,
203
204

80 F. Supp. 443 (NJ). Ga. 1948).
206 F.W. Woolworth Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1940).
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not necessarily support the inference that a pattern of discrimination
exists. For example, evidence that there are no Negroes in a work force
may not indicate that discrimination in hiring because of race has occurred; the plausibility of the inference depends upon other variables.
Obviously, when a large company in an area with a diverse population
is found to have no Negro employees, even though it hires new men
regularly and has standard job requirements, the inference of discrimination is reasonable. A similar inference in the case of a small company
with limited hiring might well be unjustified.
Proof largely dependent upon probabilities was accepted by the Supreme Court in the Jury Selection Cases: the habitual absence of Negroes
from juries,, coupled with presence in the district of Negroes qualified to
serve, was held to be ground for retrial when the state failed to introduce
contrary evidence.2 0 7 The statistical technique upheld in the Jury Selection Cases may not, however, permit of ready transposition to employment cases, because jurors are conscripted and there are many more
variable factors necessarily present in employment. Estimation of how
many of a district's Negroes meet the relatively simple standards imposed
upon jurors is far easier than calculating the number of Negroes in an
area competent to perform jobs of a certain difficulty; in employment
cases the number of Negro applicants and the rate of job turnover must
usually be considered as well. 208 Nevertheless the Attorney General of
one state with an FEP statute similar to title VII has stated in a written
opinion that any work force composed solely of individuals of one color
209
or race is prima fade discriminatory.
Fears that statistical evidence of employment patterns might be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination have contributed
to complaints that businesses will be forced to favor minority groups in
hiring. To alleviate just such fears, the Senate added a provision which
states specifically that none of the persons covered by title VII need
grant preferential treatment to any individual or group simply because
a race or class is proportionally under-represented in any geographical
area or its available work force.21 0 Conversely, an explicit attempt either
to prefer a racial or religious group, or to hire in accordance with quotas,
would be contrary to congressional intent21 ' and would undoubtedly be
207 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
208 See generally Note, An American Legal Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17

U. Cm. L. Rv. 107 (1949).
209 43 OPs. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 200 (1964); see also 1957 SCAD
54-55, cited in Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526, 558 n.197 (1961).
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Hence some employers will in effect be

locked into past employment patterns which they will be unable to alter
deliberately by selective hiring on the basis of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. But even these employers will be protected, for when
such patterns are attributable to employment practices before the Civil
Rights Act they should not be permitted to raise the inference that discrimination was practiced subsequent to its passage.
3. Proof by Individual Litigants. Often evidence available to an individual plaintiff will be limited to two principal types: (a) that a pattern from which discrimination may be inferred exists, and (b) that he
is qualified for the employment in question. It is suggested that introduction of both types of evidence should be sufficient to shift the burden of
coming forward to the defendant and to warrant a directed verdict for
the plaintiff if the defendant fails to reply. Introduction of evidence of
either a discriminatory pattern or of individual competence may also
in some cases be sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.
It has long been recognized, as the Supreme Court stated in 1957, that
"Any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may
be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would
require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race." 110 CoNG. REc.
7213 (1964) (memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and Case).
212 In a case decided before either the federal government or the state involved had
a FEP law, a store with a 50% Negro clientele sued to enjoin a civil rights group from
picketing because it employed only white clerks. The California Supreme Court
allowed the injunction on the grounds that the group's declared purpose of inducing
the retail establishment, in the course of personnel changes, to hire Negro workers in
proportion to Negro patronage was illegal because the picketers' aim, if realized,
would have instituted a dosed shop for Negroes. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.
2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1947). Justice Traynor dissented because he did not agree that a
dosed shop would result, but added: "Had California adopted a fair employment
practices act that prohibited consideration of the race of applicants for jobs, it might
be said that the demand for proportional hiring would be a demand that Lucky
[Stores] violate the law." Id. at 869, 198 P.2d at 896. The Supreme Court affirmed,
following the California court's reasoning that picketing for such a purpose was illegal
even without an FEP law. Hughes v. California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). With Judge
Traynor's condition met by the enactment of both state and federal statutes, Hughes
v. California stands more strongly than ever before. In a 1964 case, the Indiana
Supreme Court relied heavily upon it. Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 198
N.E.2d 765 (Ind. 1964).
This will create problems for activist civil rights groups which have made
demands for preferential hiring. It may also discourage well-meaning corporation
executives who wish to begin to employ -more Negroes for humanitarian reasons, and
other employers who merely wish to be able to point to a visible percentage of
minority group members in their work forces if a title VIII charge is levied against
them. If, however, an employer does not reject a person of greater ability in order to
employ a member of a minority group his choice will be legal. Those organizations
which wish to see more Negroes employed in certain industries might therefore urge
intensive recruitment among minority groups so that employers who are willing to
hire Negroes will legally be able to do so by having well-qualified candidates from
whom to choose.
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"the ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place
the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the
knowledge of his adversary." 213 In certain areas of the law, such as prosecutions brought under state licensing statutes214 and tax delinquency charges
based upon the net-worth theory,215 the courts commonly shift the burden
of coming forward. In arbitration over discharge disputes the burden has
generally been shifted to the employer, 216 and appellate courts have
tended to follow suit implicitly in a wide range of cases. 217 It has been
pointed out that otherwise the plaintiff would initially have the onerous
task of rebutting every possible justification which the respondent might
advance for his allegedly discriminatory action. Against the institution of)
a comparable procedure in title VII cases, however, the argument will
be made that it was apparently the legislative intent to keep the burden
of proof on the plaintiff.218 But to be fair to the grievant and to give

effect to the purposes of the act, as soon as the plaintiff shows that one
of the forbidden criteria offers a reasonable explanation for the defendant's conduct, the burden of coming forward should be shifted to the
defendant so that he is required to demonstrate that he was motivated by)
lawful considerations.
In some cases the use of evidence of discrimination against a group to
establish the probability of discrimination against an individual will be
persuasive, 2 19 although generally the inference it provides should not be
conclusive. Hence the floor managers of title VII in the Senate described
"the presence or absence of other members of the same minority group
in a work force" as a "relevant factor in determining whether in a given
case a decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based on race," but as
only "one factor" and not a controlling one.2 20 Nevertheless if a defend213 United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957). See
generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).

214 Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) (dictum); Rossi v. United States, 289
U.S. 89 (1933).
215 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954). Cf. Rosen & Maguire, What Worth
-Net Worth, 28 BoSroN B. BULL. 281, 285 (1956).
216 See Chambers, Burden of Proof in Labor Arbitrations, 3 DUKE B.J. 127, 132-35
(1953) and cases cited therein.
217 Cf., e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Law v. NLRB,
192 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Chicago Steel Foundry Co., 142 F.2d 306 (7th Cir.
1944); NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938).
218 110 CONG. REC. 15866 (1964) (memorandum submitted by Senator Humphrey);
110 CONG. REc. 11848 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
219 The willingness with which courts receive evidence of custom of a business
establishment, if reasonably regular and uniform, should permit use of a business
custom of discrimination to indicate its probable occurrence on a particular occasion.
Cf. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 162 (1954).
220 110 CONG. RFc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and Case).
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ant introduces probability evidence comparable to that upon which the
Attorney General could justifiably rely, he might well be considered to
have met his initial burden. 221 Any complaints of injustice on the
grounds that he has not shown that the alleged discrimination was
directed toward him are vitiated by the circumstance that if the Attorney
General were suing such evidence could stand by itself.
Another method of establishing a strong inference of discrimination
would be to prove that the grievant was qualified for the job in question. 222 In many cases it may be relatively simple for an individual to

prove his competence; a Connecticut court found prima facie discrimination against a Negro job applicant when the company's sole stated con2 23
ditions were that employees be over eighteen and able to work nights.
For more skilled positions, of course, the burden upon the complainant
of proving sufficient expertise will be heavier.
Evidence of competence seems particularly attractive because it not
only imposes a considerable burden upon the plaintiff but also offers the
defendant ample opportunity to meet the plaintiff's contention on its own
ground; for example, if the plaintiff's competence is alleged, it should
not be difficult for the defendant to prove the contrary if the man does
not possess the requisite qualifications. 224 Such an approach would encourage employers to keep records supporting their decisions; once a man
is hired, seniority, merit, and piecework systems, which have been expressly safeguarded in the act, 225 would also be useful in comparing the

plaintiff's work record to those of other employees. 220 The act also permits
use of "any professionally-developed ability test [which] . . . is not designed, intended or used to discriminate."227 If the defendant cannot
221

See Arnett v. Seattle Gen. Hosp., reported in 6

RAcE REL.

L.

REP.

338 (1961),

aff'd, 65 Wash. 2d 1, 395 P.2d 503 (1964).
222 This approach will be most useful for individual plaintiffs, for proof that each
member of a class is competent to perform any but the most menial tasks may be
onerous.
223 Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (Super. Ct. 1953).
224 See Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 3 App. Div. 514, 162 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
225

Section 703(h).

The plaintiff's natural counter-argument would be that the system was not
"bona fide." But even if the system itself is "'bona fide," an employer's management of
it may be held discriminatory. Cf. Delaney v. Conway, 39 Misc. 2d 499, 241 N.Y.S.2d
384 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (plaintiff's complaint that his seniority rights were transferred
because he had been active in civil rights activities upheld).
227 Section 703(h). This safeguard was not included in the act until Senator Tower
won its adoption as an amendment in the last days of Senate debate. 110 CoNG. REc.
13724 (1964). Tower's amendment was prompted by the holding of an Illinois FEP
hearing examiner that a professionally developed test in general use by many employers was inherently discriminatory to culturally deprived Negroes. On review, the
full FEP Board decided the case against the employer on other grounds. Myart v.
226
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offer particular evidence to demonstrate that an applicant was unqualified for a job, a logical inference might well be drawn that he has
illegally discriminated. But even so, direct refutation of the plaintiff's
demonstration of competence need not exhaust the possibilities of
defense. An employer might, for example, prove that although the plaintiff was competent, other applicants were better qualified, or he might
merely show that for economic reasons he had decided to take on no new
men at the time of the plaintiff's application. Even if the plaintiff clearly
had been rejected for reasons of religion, sex, or national origin, a narrow
escape clause still exists: an employer can indicate that the factor constituted a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of . . . [his] particular business or enterprise." 228

If a requirement that a plaintiff make out a case of prima facie qualification became a sine qua non for FEP litigation, employers, unions
and employment agencies would be adequately protected from harassment by undeserving complainants. And if it became the practice to shift
the burden of coming forward upon the introduction of such evidence,
deserving grievants should also benefit substantially. The plaintiff's
Motorola, 55 LAB. REL. REP. 372 (1964), af'd in part, 58 LAB. REL REP. 2573-78 (Cir.
Ct. Cook County 1965) text of examiner's report reprinted in 110 CONG. REc.
5662-64 (1964). If Tower's intent was to ensure that a court could not declare a test
discriminatory on its face, he failed because the court may still declare it unlawful if
it finds that it was designed to discriminate. Section 703(h) also allows a court to
hold that the use of even an unbiased professionally developed test was discriminatory.
228 This exception is unlikely to permit of much abuse, as even economic necessity
cannot justify discrimination on the basis of race or color. See Hearings on Equal
Employment Opportunity Before Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1963). The
courts, upon reference to the judicial interpretations which Congress tacitly adopted
along with the wording of the state statutes, will also find that the exception has been
narrowly construed in the past to include only those attributes necessary for performance of the work itself. Hence state commissions have refused to accept requests
for exceptions based on the desires of co-workers, preference of customers, preservation of a traditional religious or national atmosphere, or maintenance of customary
patterns of employment. See Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 526, 560 (1961); Note, 68 HARv. L.
REV. 685, 688 n.17 (1955). For example, the decision of the New York Commission on
Human Rights to allow the Arabian American Oil Co. to enquire into the religion of
job applicants because Saudi Arabia, the country in which it was doing business, would
not grant visas to Jews, was reversed on appeal and eventually remanded by the New
York Court of Appeals to the Commission with orders to arrange a settlement without
allowing a formal exception. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 100 App. Div. 2d
833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157, aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961), final panel opinion
and stipulation reported in 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 276 (1963). Religion has been rejected
as a bona fide occupational qualification for probation officers although the law permitted children to be supervised by an officer of own faith, American Jewish Congress
v. Hill, reported in 1 RAcE REt. L. REP. 971 (1956), and for employees although the
jobs in question had to be performed on religious holidays, see Spitz, Tailoring the
Techniques to Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination, 14 BUFFALO L. REv.
79, 89-90 (1964).
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strongest case, which should definitely justify the judge in finding for
him if the defendant fails to come forward with evidence of his own,
will be to combine proof of his own individual competence with evidence
m 2
of a pattern of discrimination against his class.
C. Relief Available Under Title VII
A final and crucial factor determining how effectively title VII is enforced will be the relief the courts authorize under it. The enabling
language is broad: "The court may . . . order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay .... ,230 But this section was originally
drawn to authorize relief of an incidental nature when title VII was still
conceived to be creating primarily a "public right"; when the theory was
altered to create a private right the language was changed only slightly.
Whether courts will interpret the broad language restrictively after the
original understanding or to its full capacity in view of the new theory
will be of vital importance. 231 If awards are inadequate, few grievants will
bother to sue.
Criteria for determining appropriate relief were originally meant to
be drawn from judicial and administrative interpretations of the similar
NLRA provision.2 32 Most readily analogous is back pay, since the phrasing is identical and the purpose of each provision is to compensate a
person for the time he has been unlawfully deprived of employment.
Although frequently granted by the NLRB,233 back pay as a remedial
device has seldom been utilized by state FEPCs. 23 4 The federal courts
would serve both the'remedial and preventive purposes of title VII by
conforming to the NLRB practice. Actual losses should be made good,
See St. Paul FEPC ex rel. White v. Midwest Bldg. Servs., Inc., reported in 9
L. Rits. 385 (1964) (coincidence of three forms of proof found conclusive:
(1) general employment pattern, characterized by unexplained absence of Negroes as
patrolmen while -many were employed as custodial servicemen although the employer
was in both instances "tapping the same labor supply"; (2) qualifications of complainant,
which respondent stipulated to be "impeccable"; (3) reasons given by respondent for
failure to hire neither substantial nor apparently bona fide).
230 Section 706(g).
231 See text at notes 16-22 supra.
232 See 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). Section 10(c) of
the NLRA authorizes the Board to "take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
subchapter ......
233 See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (union which had
not been joined as respondent compelled to pay back wages); NLRB v. West Coast
Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1953) (back pay required in absence of order to
reinstate).
234 See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions, 14
BUFFALO L. Rrv. 22 (1964).
229
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with deductions for earnings by the worker and for losses which he
wilfully incurred.2 35 The plaintiff should not, however, be required
substantially to "lower his sights" when seeking alternative employment.

236

An important form of redress derived from NLRA experience will be
orders to reinstate and to hire. Reinstatement is a remedy familiar from
labor law, but orders to hire have been utilized less frequently.23 7 But
courts need not hesitate to grant hiring orders because of reluctance
to force unwanted personal associations, since Congress has taken care to
prevent this by refraining from covering employers with less than twentyfive employees.23 8 Other NLRA relief which courts may find appropriate
might include orders to grant union membership and back seniority, and,
as incremental financial compensation, orders to pay bonus or incentive
earnings, vacation allowances, tips, interest on the loss incurred and
fringe benefits.

2 39

The change from public rights to private remedies in the act's orientation raises the possibility that broader relief than that granted under the
NLRA should be made available. In construing the authorization to
"order such affirmative action as may be appropriate," 240 the phrase
"affirmative action" may be read broadly on the supposition that the clause
following "appropriate" was not meant to exclude remedies which were
not specified. This construction would justifiably permit unusual equitable relief, although the language of the act would be strained if tort
damages were included as well.
Additional awards in tort, however, may be essential to encourage individual grievants to litigate their claims. By recognizing the existence
of a cause of action based upon unlawful interference with prospective
economic advantage, exemplary damages or compensation for mental
suffering could be permitted without doing violence to legislative intent. Joinder of dual claims would permit plaintiffs to
rely upon this cause of action in conjunction with their formal title VII
complaints, although juries would probably be necessary to try the issues
Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
Cf. Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320 (1950).
237 But see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
238 Sections 701(b), (e). See 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (statement of Senator
Humphrey that at 25 employees, concerns "lose most of whatever intimate personal
character they might have had").
239 Cf., e.g., Omar Constr. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1534 (1963) (Christmas bonus); Isis
Plumbing g Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 (1962) (interest at 6%); Brown & Root, Inc.,
132 N.L.R.B. 486 (1961) (necessary expenditures while seeking other work, such as
travel, moving expenses for family, etc.); Aerosonic Instr. Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 412 (1960)
(bonus or incentive earnings); Home Rest Drive-In, 127 N.L.R.B. 635 (1960) (tips).
240 Section 706(g).
235
236
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Even before the Civil Rights Act it was suggested that

discrimination in employment might be an emerging tort; 242 reference

to title VII and the Fair Representation doctrine would serve to substantiate an employer's or union's duty not to interfere with economic
advantage by unfair discrimination. 243 Any judicial reluctance to award
such relief should be lessened because intent would necessarily be an integral facet of proof. 244 Recent recognition of other private causes of
action in the general civil rights area, both by reliance on fundamental
rights secured in statutes 245 and by implication from newly-created statutory rights, 246 would afford strong precedent for recognition of such a

private right here.
Within the domain of the public right Congress, as in earlier legislation, has left the task of formulating standards of relief to "the judicial
process of adapting appropriate equitable remedies to specific solitions." 247 So open-ended is the statute that only the prior case law will
limit the breadth 248 and vagueness 249 of court orders. Orders requiring
specific affirmative action are possible. That such orders can be more
effective to end discrimination than general prohibitory injunctions
241

See Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 552 (1913).

242

See

GREGORY & KALvEN, CASEs ON ToR's

842 (1959).

See the argument of the Michigan Supreme Court that the purpose of the
Michigan FEP law is solely "to extend and make more specific" rights which an
individual possessed previously. Highland Park v. FEPC, 364 Mich. 508, I11 N.W.2d
797 (1961). Tide VII seems also to be based on this rationale, as § 707 refers to "rights
secured" rather than "created" by the title.
244 See Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants' Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 512, 245 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
245 Ibid.; see also Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1956); Note, Anti-Discrimination Law as a Vehicle for a Private Civil Action, 17
243

VAND.

L. Rav. 1506 (1964).

Cf. Wills v. TWA, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (actual and punitive
damages awarded passenger "bumped" from over-sold flight after he cited F.A.A.,
which authorizes injunctive and criminal sanctions, to demonstrate airline under
duty to carry him promptly and without inconvenience); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) (civil liability imposed for interception of
telephone conversation in violation of F.C.A.). See generally, Note, Implying Civil
Remedies from FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 H~av. L. Rav. 285 (1963).
247 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946).
248 Cf. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 126 (1948);
Russell C. House Transfer- & Storage Co. v. United States, 189 F.2d 349, 351 (5th Cir.
1951). For resum6 of pre-1945 decisions, see May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S.
376, 388-90 (1940); for more recent cases, MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE, 65.11, at 1665
(2d ed. 1955).
249 The injunction must not be "so vague as to put the whole conduct of the
defendant's business at the peril of a summons of contempt." NLRB v. Express
Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941) citing Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396
(1905).
246
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is illustrated by the approach taken by the New York Supreme Court to
fashion non-discriminatory methods of designating apprentices in the
sheet metal trade.2 50 The possibilities offered under the statute's permissive wording for tailoring remedies to the specific circumstances of
each case should give the judiciary ample opportunity to experiment
with variant methods for ensuring compliance with title VII.
CONCLUSION

Despite the problems inherent in implementing any fair employment
legislation, it should be possible to enforce title VII. In important respects
the Dirksen amendments have augmented the act's potential effectiveness.
It is questionable whether even the powerful quasi-judicial administrative agency originally envisaged would have been an appropriate enforcement mechanism. Past experience indicates that it would have engendered
substantial bureaucratic delay,251 which would undoubtedly have dissuaded many unemployed grievants from pressing their complaints.
Although the procedures of referral required by the amended act seem
labyrinthine, the short time limitations imposed upon each stage assure
a grievant that he will be able to file his case for final judicial enforcement within six months.2 52 Furthermore, compelling incentives now exist
for speedy local solutions to problems which admit of more sensitive
treatment by state administrators than by a federal bureaucracy. Such
decentralized action may strengthen the moral teaching of the law and
help to create the consensus essential to the achievement of nondiscriminatory employment.
If progress toward consensus lags, title VII can serve to spur it. Under
title VII individual citizens are offered a way of pressing directly for
judicial enforcement of the right to equal treatment. The Federal
Executive, through its authority to initiate and intervene in litigation,
can also assume the task of presenting a coherent program for enforcement to the courts. Few precedents exist for the broad discretionary
power given to the Justice Department; states generally have denied
their Attorneys General such license in FEP cases, preferring instead to
grant remedial and preventive power to nonpartisan commissions. Recently certain civil rights spokesmen have expressed dissatisfaction with
such nonpartisan efforts, 253 and others have urged that the movement
250 State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
251 Cf. 27th NLRB ANN. REP., 268-69 (1962); Rabkin, Enforcement of Laws Again'
Discriminationin Employment, 14 BUFFALO L. Rv. 100, 104 (1964).
252 But see note 108 supra.
253 See Hill, supra note 234.
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they lead be redirected from its early protest orientation.25 4 Such is the
structure of title VII that minority group pressure applied directly upon
the federal government through traditional political channels could now,
for the first time, lead to significant progress in enforcement of fair
employment law.
254 See Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
Commentary, Feb. 1965, p. 25.

